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MYSTICISM AND EARLY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

In the following paper I am going to present the way in which early analytic philosophy approached the topic of mysticism. My intention is to show that contrary to popular opinions first analytic philosophers were not hostile to the idea of a mystical experience, although they conceived mysticism in a special philosophical way. In order to achieve this goal my paper will be divided into four parts. At the beginning I shall explain the origins of analytic philosophy with an emphasis on its consequences for the topics of mysticism and religion. Then, in section 2, I shall comment on the metaphysical standpoint characteristic to the early stages of analytic movement which was called by Bertrand Russell the logical atomism. According to a popular claim this point of view supposedly does not leave any room for non-naturalistic worldviews, because of its ties to the metaphysical atomism. In the third part of the paper, I shall analyse two approaches to the topic of mysticism: the first one is mostly forgotten but at the same time worth of reminding. It is Bertrand Russell's approach that was expressed in some of his papers gathered in the collection called *Mysticism and Logic*. The second one is well known and could be found in Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*. In the last part, section 4, I am going to answer the question of the sources of the unexpected mysticism in Russell's and early Wittgenstein's writings.

1. INTELLECTUAL SOURCES OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

When one talks about the beginnings of the analytic movement, one usually emphasises its rejection of British idealism, prevalent in the Anglo-Saxon philosophy of the XIX century. In stark contrast to vague and holistic speculations of idealism authors such as Bertrand Russell, Gottlob Frege, George Edward Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein were driven in their academic endeavour by the need for clarification, precision and reasoning. They were focused on punctual, clearly separated from each other, problems. If one can associate with Hegel (the most prominent representative of idealism in philosophy) the idea of synthesis, then, in opposition to his way of philosophizing, Russell and others intentionally associated themselves with the idea of analysis. Hence, the name for a new school of philosophy that emerged at the turn of the XIX and XX centuries in Great Britain.

According to Russell in order to ensure progress in philosophy one does not have to necessarily follow the results of contemporary science. Most famous examples of an application of science to philosophy at the turn of the XIX and XX centuries were philosophies of Henri Bergson and Friedrich Nietzsche. Although both of these thinkers made use of Darwinism, they were inspired by science in a way that cemented their reputation of being adversaries of rationality. This lesson led Russell (1901/1948, 76) to believe that an analytic philosopher should follow the method and not necessarily the results of science. The author of *Principia Mathematica* had hope that the methods of formal logic developed in the XIX century by (among others) George Boole and Giuseppe Peano would provide the means to achieve the long-awaited progress in philosophy. Formal logic could make Leibniz's dream come true – at the time it seemed that it created a possibility that it would be possible to *calculate* which side of the philosophical argument is right (only later we found out that this dream turned out to be a mirage). As an example of a successful application of mathematical methods in philosophy Russell (1901/1948, 80) gave the solution of Zeno's paradoxes owned to the works of the German mathematician, Georg Cantor. Cantor showed that what was for centuries considered to be the inherent contradiction in the concept of infinity resulted from the affirmation of the erroneous principle according to which if a set is a subset of another set, then it contains fewer elements than the set of which it is a part of. This principle is valid with respect to finite numbers, but it fails if applied to infinite numbers (i.e., the set of even numbers has no fewer elements than the set of integers). Zeno's paradox falsely assumes that since the set of number of points in space conquered by Achilles will always be a subset of the set of number of points conquered by a turtle, it will always contain fewer elements, too. According to Russell (1901/1948, 96), Cantor, along with the solution of the

problem of the alleged inconsistency of the notion of infinity, sent into oblivion philosophies based on misconceptions about infinity, and that included not only Eleatics (after all, this could be treated merely as a historical curiosity), but also Kant's epistemology and Hegel's dialectics, which constituted a trunk of a contemporary to him philosophy.

Let us take a different example: according to Russell (1914a/1948, 99), the proper meaning of the Copernican revolution consists in the rejection of the concept of the world as a whole, because it is conditioned by the existence of a centre of the universe which by being in relations with other elements of a whole creates a certain order. Russell thought that since there is no use of the notion of a cosmos in the modern astrophysics, then metaphysics should also abandon the notion of a cosmos or its synonyms like the unity of the world or the world as a whole. If astronomy discovers that there is no privileged place in the universe, then human beings should no longer view the world through the lens of their interests and emotions. For example, ethical notions such as concepts of progress or advance should be extruded from a scientific philosophy. Otherwise, one would commit the mistake of anthropomorphism: "Organic life, we are told, has developed gradually from the protozoon to the philosopher, and this development, we are assured, is indubitably an advance. Unfortunately, it is the philosopher, not the protozoon, who gives this assurance" (Russell 1914a/1948, 106).

The above examples serve the aim of showing how early analytic philosophy, paraphrasing later Wittgenstein (2009, 53), brought traditional concepts of metaphysics (such as the notions of infinity, the world, the good etc.) to their scientific or logical use. One could say that early analytic philosophers faced a dilemma: either a philosopher would take an advantage of scientific methods and would use metaphysical concepts in the meaning conferred on them by science and logic or he or she would halt in endless and futile discussions of the past. If a philosopher would indeed welcome scientific methods in his or her work, then he or she would be impartial, that is, he or she would avoid a human perspective when theorizing about philosophical matters. From this point of view, one should not expect from analytic philosophers an elaborate discussion on mystical and ethical experiences which not only as a source of knowledge seem to be the farthest from a scientific enterprise, but also necessarily involve an anthropocentric and a subjective worldview. Russell's commentator, Stephen Nathanson (1985, 15), claims that "there seems to be no positive place for religion in Russell's thinking". This anti-subjectivism is the main source of a suspicion that early analytic philosophy was not interested in religion, aesthetics, ethics or mysticism.

2. The logical atomism

One could find confirmation for the above opinion in the metaphysical standpoint of Bertrand Russell and early Ludwig Wittgenstein, which is often called "logical atomism". The logical atomism is usually defined as a view according to which logical analysis of every proposition reveals that it is either an elementary proposition or a truth-function on an elementary proposition. Elementary propositions are true or false independently of truth or falsity of other elementary propositions and they are combinations of simple symbols or names (Proops 2011). According to others (Pears 1987, 63), the logical atomism is a theory that claims that there is a limit to the analysis of the factual language. The analysis reveals the most basic names which stand for simple things, which could be, according to Russell (1915/1948, 143), sense-data. The difference between the aforementioned descriptions of the logical atomism consists in different views on its relation to metaphysics. According to Proop's definition the logical atomism is a purely linguistic theory with no bearing on how we should see the world. According to Pears, however, in order for the logical atomism to be true one has to assume a specific ontology – the ontology of simple objects. Even though we have at our disposal Malcolm's testimony according to which during the time of writing the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein thought of himself as a logician, "and that it was not his business, as a logician, to try to decide whether this thing or that was a simple thing or a complex thing, that being purely *empirical* matter" (Malcolm 1986, 70), one could still support Pears' interpretation. It is because we do not have to determine the nature of simple objects (whether they are mass-particles, like Lampert's reading of the *Tractatus* (Lampert 2000, 286) or sense-data, like in Cook's interpretation (1994, 14)) in order to affirm their existence.

Wittgenstein (2002, 7) grounded his conviction in the existence of simple objects in the existence of meaningful propositions: "[If the world had no substance], we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false)" (TLP 2.0212). In order to understand the argument, one has to take a look at Tractarian picture theory of meaning. According to it a sentence has a meaning because it is a picture of a state of affairs – there is a parallel between elements of a state of affairs and elements of a sentence which expresses a given state of affair (Wittgenstein 2002, 9); an elementary proposition is a nexus of names (Wittgenstein 2002, 36) and names denote objects (Wittgenstein 2002, 15). Therefore, a sentence has meaning because names in an elementary proposition are reaching (or touching using Tractarian metaphor) objects which constitute a state of affairs expressed by an elementary proposition (Wittgenstein 2002, 9; 1979, 6).

Wittgenstein also discerned between falsehood of a sentence and its meaninglessness. A sentence is false when it states something about existing ob-

jects, but it wrongly reflects their relation to one another ("Cracow is the current capitol of Poland"). Meaninglessness happens when a sentence contains empty names and tries to say something about non-existing objects ("The present king of Poland is bald"). Now, we can go back to thesis 2.0212: if there were no objects – it states – then all sentences would have been meaningless, but the existence of logic, rational thinking, etc. proves the opposite. At least some of sentences are meaningful and therefore Wittgenstein concludes that there are objects. Once he establishes the existence of objects his acceptance of the logical atomism leads him to thesis 2.02: "Objects are simple" (Wittgenstein 2002, 7).

The logical atomism is a good example of a philosophical liberation from thinking gravitating towards the self. According to a proponent of the logical atomism the most fundamental statement about reality is that it consists of simple objects, none of which occupy a distinguished position, including the self. Moreover, Russell and Wittgenstein would deny that the self is a simple object. According to Russell the self is a complex of simple objects and according to early Wittgenstein the self is not an object at all. Instead, he described it as a limit of the world. Second, the logical atomism is also a good example of characteristic to early analytic philosophy application of logical theories to metaphysics. The metaphysical thesis about the existence of the substance, as we have seen, comes from the reflection about language. To paraphrase Kant, the existence of the simples is a postulate of a linguistic reason.

3. MYSTICISM IN RUSSELL'S AND WITTGENSTEIN'S WRITINGS

The logical atomism which resembles the materialistic system of Democritus, by exorcising a human perspective of looking at the world leaves no room for free-will and so-called higher values such as the value of good, beauty and the meaning of life. Subjective experiences seem to be of no relevance for an analytic philosopher, too. It should not come as a surprise that Wittgenstein (2002, 29) concluded in the *Tractatus* that "the totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science". It follows that everything that is out of scope of natural science, including mystical experiences, is viewed to be senseless. However, what should come as a surprise is the fact that despite of this one can find by Russell and early Wittgenstein a bunch of remarks on mysticism and mystical experiences. In the following passages I shall present these remarks (section 3) and I will try to explain their place in the philosophical systems which *prima facie* should be hostile or at least dismissive to mystical experiences (section 4).

3.1. Russell's scientific mysticism.

Russell summarized his views on mysticism in two papers: *Free Man's Worship* (1902) and *Mysticism and Logic* (1914). According to him mysticism is characterized by the set of beliefs such as the belief in knowledge which may be called insight or intuition, the belief that the world as appearance is utterly different from a Reality, the belief that a Reality taken as a whole is a unity, the denial of the reality of time, the belief that "all evil is mere appearance" (Russell 1914b/1948, 9-10). He also acknowledged that a consequence of the mystical experience is the feeling of peace. To be sure he rejected all the above beliefs as literally false, but it did not mean that he viewed mysticism as useless: "Mysticism is to be commended as an attitude towards life, not as a creed about the world" (Russell 1914b/1948, 11). Mystical experiences are mistaken if we take them to be veridical, but if we take them for what they are – as expressing human needs – they can inspire what is the best in mankind. For example, a mystic denies the reality of time. He is wrong in thinking that the past has the same reality as the presence, but Russell notices the emotion standing behind this belief is valuable also in a scientific inquiry and philosophy. It is the desire to contemplate the world impartially, "and impartiality of contemplation is, in the intellectual sphere, that very same virtue of disinterestedness which, in the sphere of action, appears as justice and unselfishness" (Russell 1914b/1948, 22). Hence, a philosopher has to have a hidden mystic inside of him or her. On Russell view, the success of philosophy depends on applying scientific methods to its investigations. Scientific methods demand the attitude of impartiality, a blind eye when it comes to the interests of the self. This, as it turns out, comes easy for a person that has mystical inclinations. In contrast to the Vienna Circle, Russell did not form an opposition between science and mysticism, but viewed the latter as a pre-supposition of being engaged in the former.

Russell was far from a reductionist view on human life. He recognized for example a human need to worship. According to him the need to worship is not characteristic to merely religious people, but to all of us. Against naturalistic tendencies of his philosophy, he believed that we are free in our thoughts and our decisions. Hence, one of the most consequential decisions of a human being is the decision what to worship. Interestingly, he dismissed the answers of naturalistic philosophies like Nietzsche's advice to worship brute force: "the slave is doomed to worship Time and Fate and Death" (Russell 1902/1948, 55). A free man no longer bows in the subjection before them, but he is ready to absorb them and make it a part of himself. Russell (1902/1948, 50) prioritized religious impulses over naturalistic ones, because faith enables people "to live constantly in the vi-

sion of the good". He valued especially a mystical attitude to the world. It was because a mystic knows the wisdom of renunciation, he or she is free from sorrow and "failures and disenchantments of the world of fact" (Russell 1902/1948, 52). One has to recognize that the universe is unworthy of worship and recognize that the self belongs to the universe. As such the self must die, "for only so can the soul be freed from the empire of Fate" (Russell 1902/1948, 53). This unexpected statement which resembles writings of religious mystics proves that the rejection of the self in the early analytic philosophy was not only the result of the Copernican revolution and efforts to look at the world *sub specie aeternitatis*, but it also had clear moral connotations: "to abandon the struggle for private happiness, to expel all eagerness of temporary desire, to burn with passion for eternal things – this is emancipation, and this is the free man's worship" (Russell 1902/1948, 55). It does not mean that Russell's mysticism revealed a religious reverence to a higher power. His position resembles Camus' existentialism with its advice to base the life on "the firm foundation of unyielding despair" (Moser 2013, 2). Indeed, Russell (1902/1948, 57) compared our fate to "a weary but unyielding Atlas" that sustains alone the world of his own ideals that he has fashioned "despite the trampling march of unconscious power". We march through life seized by the commands of the omnipotent death. Life of a man is brief but he or she is able to decide to "shed sunshine on one's path (...), to strengthen failing courage, to instil hope in hours of despair" (Russell 1902/1948, 56).

3.2. Wittgenstein's logical mysticism

In section 2 I have argued that one of the most important metaphysical theses of the *Tractatus* was the postulate of the existence of the substance, and more precisely of the simple objects. Wittgenstein was aware that it was no business of logic to determine the nature of the simples. According to him logical truths are tautologies that says nothing about the world and, consequently, the interest of logic is focused on "the scaffolding of the world" and not on the subject matter of propositions that logic analyses (Wittgenstein 2002, 76). This indifference and unconcern to the question of how things are was crucial for the occurrence of mystical attitudes in early Wittgenstein's thought. It also differentiates his account of mysticism from that represented by Russell, who linked mystical attitudes with the pursuit of truth. Precisely speaking, since Russell was hostile to philosophical systems with their whole-encompassing statements, he did not believe in the truth about the world taken as a whole, but in truths about particular state of affairs delivered by natural science. On the other hand, early Wittgenstein felt disdain for empirical inquiry. He even wrote: "We feel that even when

all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched" (Wittgenstein 2002, 88). For Wittgenstein, the state of the world is irrelevant not only to the solution of the problems of logic but also to the solution of the problems of life: this is a feature that logic shares in common with mysticism. A logician is interested in the world insofar as it is a condition for the possibility of logic. In other words, a logician sees the world as a whole, and this is what is mystical in the logical experience. To cite the *Tractatus*: "Feeling the world as a limited whole—it is this that is mystical" (Wittgenstein 2002, 88). This is also why Russell called Wittgenstein's mysticism "logical".

In the end Wittgenstein's and Russell's paths to mysticism connect. They both agree that the most fundamental mystical experience is seeing the world impartially *sub specie aeternitatis*, they both conclude that it means that the self must disappear from the picture of the world, and they both claim that the result of this dissolution of *ego* is that our everyday ethical concepts of right and wrong lose their meanings. One can accordingly ascribe the concept of mysticism to the above set of beliefs, because it resembles a religious mysticism with its precept that *ego* must disappear in front of God and with its negative theology that refuses to ascribe to God any attributions, including the attribute of being good (in this context one has to mention the motive of the negative theology in the *Tractatus* – its famous last thesis: "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" (Wittgenstein 2002, 89)). The other feature that Russell's and Wittgenstein's mysticisms have in common with a religious mysticism is the irrationality of sources: they are both based on specific, inexplicable experiences (on the one hand the experience of the world as a whole, the experience of seeing the world from nowhere and, on the other hand, the experience of a divine presence), and not on reasoning (there is no inference that ends with the conclusion that the self must not enter into a depicted world in Russell's or Wittgenstein's writings just like there is no inference that a God exists in religious mystic's writings). Obviously, with respect to Russell and Wittgenstein one has to speak about a *philosophical* mysticism because it does not deal with supernatural beings, but rather with the world as an object of the human thought and inquiry.

In the following section I shall defend an interpretation of Tractarian mysticism, according to which there are not only some interesting analogies between Wittgenstein's logical mysticism and religious mysticism of saints, but there is also a continuity. In order to show it one has to go back to thesis 6.44, where Wittgenstein (2002, 88) stated: "It is not *how* things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists". In other words, not only an observation of the world *sub specie aeternitatis*, but also the experience of the contingency of the existence of the

world is tantamount to the mystical experience. Logic provides a reason to believe that the world exists and encourages us to look at it *sub specie aeternitatis* (this is the claim Russell could agree with), but Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* took a step further and started to wonder about the fact of existence as such. In doing so, he crossed the Tractarian limits of a meaningful expression, because all facts are accidental or contingent, and according to the rules of the *Tractatus*, if a proposition is in accordance with every state of affairs, it has no content and it is simply meaningless. This is why in the end Wittgenstein (2002, 89) advised a reader of his book to "throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it".

The amazement caused by the mere fact of the existence of the world is well known in the history of philosophy. It enjoys a special role in natural theology as a premise of the so-called cosmological arguments that affirm the existence of God, but one finds no similar line of reasoning in Wittgenstein's early philosophy. It is because just like a pictorial form of a proposition is a pre-condition of its meaningfulness, but one cannot state the existence of a pictorial form in a proposition, so is with God. He is the pre-condition of the existence of the world, but one cannot affirm meaningfully His existence in this world. This is at least Wittgenstein's position in the *Tractatus*. He spoke more freely about these matters in his *Notebooks*, in which we find the following entry: "To believe in God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end of the world" (Wittgenstein 1979, 73). Paul Engelmann (1967, 98), with whom Wittgenstein talked a lot during the First World War, summarized philosopher's position in the following way: "This is his one and ever recurring thought: that the higher sphere, values, God do not form a part of the contents of the world, are not something within the world, to be found in it and proved to exist: but are something manifested by the world seen from outside". A believer suspects that something exists behind the curtain of facts, but the limitations of logic, language and intellect do not allow to express this belief explicitly. The cosmological argument is an example of the reasoning to the best explanation, but Wittgenstein did not reason his way to God. For him in order to assert the existence of the Creator one has to contemplate the world from a certain point of view. A religious belief is the matter of seeing (or experiencing) and not of reasoning. Therefore, it is appropriate to speak about Wittgenstein's mysticism and not about his natural theology.

Wittgenstein's commentators notice a second motive of his mysticism that is the mysticism of the affirmation of the world. Wittgenstein (2002, 86) in the *Tractatus* stated that "the sense of the world must lie outside the world" (TLP 6.41). Facts are what they are – they morally neutral; neither morally deficient nor valuable: "In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it

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does happen" (Wittgenstein 2002, 86). These claims are a direct consequence of looking at the world *sub specie aeternitatis*. As we saw when analysing Russell's philosophy, a truly mystical attitude to the world entails seeing the self as a mere appearance, whose subjective perspectives one has to abandon in order to see the world aright. An objective reality is indifferent to me and my fate, therefore one cannot say that the world is morally good. On the other hand, there is not much sense in complaining to the impersonal world, and if that is true, then there is neither much sense in saying that the world is morally defective.

Despite all of this Wittgenstein said that there is a great difference between the world of a happy man and an unhappy man. How it is possible, since facts are what they are, and they are independent from our will (TLP 6.373)? In order to understand this, one has to notice a difference between Wittgenstein's and Russell's solution to the problem of the self. As we remember, according to both, Russell as well as Wittgenstein, there is no such thing as the self in the empirical world. For Russell this thesis meant that the self is reduced to the series of facts about one's body or one's psychological life. In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein (2002, 69) presented a different point of view, according to which the self is the limit of the world (TLP 5.632). He compared the relation of the self to the world to the relation of an eye to a visual field: "You do not see the eye. And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye" (Wittgenstein 2002, 69). Hence, both claims are true: the conviction that there is no self in the empirical world as well as the conviction that "the world is my world" (Wittgenstein 2002, 70). The later thesis is allegedly the proof for early Wittgenstein's solipsism, but one has to keep in mind that even if one labels his position as such, one has to admit that this is a specific kind of solipsism – the one in which the transcendental self has no influence on facts but it can merely alter the limits of the world (Wittgenstein 2002, 87). To use a Tractarian metaphor the worlds of a happy and of an unhappy man have the same content, but their limits are differently waxed (TLP 6.43).

I shall defend a hypothesis that according to early Wittgenstein to live a happy life means to affirm the world just like it is. Once again, the textual proof for such an interpretation one finds mainly outside the *Tractatus*. For example, in the *Notebooks* Wittgenstein (1979, 81) wrote: "How can man be happy at all, since he cannot ward off the misery of the world? (...). The life of knowledge is the life of that is happy in spite of the misery of the world. The only life that is happy is the life that can renounce the amenities of the world". Hans-Johann Glock (1996, 253) complains that there is "a noticeable break" between mysticism of the amazement about the existence of the world and the mysticism of the affirmation of the world and one's own fate in it, but in my opinion he is wrong. The feeling of

inconsistency disappears when one takes into account that the logical mysticism of early Wittgenstein is quite similar to a religious mysticism. The connection between belief in God and the ability of the acceptance of the world despite its misery and one's own suffering was made clear in *A Lecture on Ethics* which was given in 1929, but it still represents the early stages of Wittgenstein's philosophy. In his speech Wittgenstein (1965, 8) was talking about the experience of feeling absolutely safe, which he described in the following way: "I am safe, nothing can injure me whatever happens". It is important to remember that this statement came not from a philosopher who always sat safely behind his desk and was prone to catchy wording, but from a man who once was a soldier fighting in the trenches of the First World War and whose life was at some point of his life in a constant danger.

In my opinion the experience of feeling absolutely safe is essential for the mysticism of affirmation of the world. Beside the experience of the contingency of the world it is the second mystical experience characteristic to Wittgenstein's early philosophy. There is a close connection between these two, for I can feel safe in the world which taken in itself is indifferent to me and in which nothing depends on me (except my attitude to the world) only under the condition that for me the world reveals the existence of a God, whose providential power guides me through the events of my life. One can find confirmation for such a reading in the *Notebooks*, where we read: "To believe in God means to see that life has a meaning" (Wittgenstein 1979, 73). If one takes into an account a religious belief in the existence of God, then an illusion of a break between logical mysticism of the amazement about the existence of the world and the mysticism of the affirmation of the world disappears and Wittgenstein's position starts to seem cogent.

4. Explanation for the Presence of Mysticism in Early Analytic Philosophy

As I have argued there should be an element of surprise in the discovery that early analytic philosophers with their rationalistic and scientistic reputation were interested in the topic of mysticism. Brian McGuinness (2002, 55) with respect to the *Tractatus* speaks even about two apparently contradictory aspects of it. Is there indeed a contradiction between mystical and logical parts of Russell's and Wittgenstein's philosophy? One can dismiss a mystical aspect of early analytic philosophy by referring to biographies of Russell and Wittgenstein. Indeed, they explain something: for example, in 1902, when Russell wrote *Free Man's Worship* he was still under the influence of Platonism, which he rejected around

1910, when he started to view judgements and truth-values not as Fregean third-world beings but as, respectively, incomplete symbols and relations between and an act of judgement and a fact (Hacker 1996, 13-14). Wittgenstein's biography also explains a religious turn in his intellectual interests. It began in 1916, when Wittgenstein tormented by atrocities of war and cruelness and stupidity of his fellow soldiers, entered a bookstore in Tarnów and bought Tolstoy's *Gospel in Brief*, from which he borrowed the concept of the problems of life (Idziak-Smoczyńska 2018, 61). From this moment entries in his *Notebooks* were dominated by the problems of God, religion, meaning of life, and of the Last Judgement.

However, a mere historical explanation would not be quite fair to these two great thinkers. It would assume that they were not only inconsistent in their thinking, but also unaware of it. We have at our disposal indications that their inclination to mysticism was inherent to their philosophical positions. In the last section of this paper, I shall point out to these features of philosophy of Russell and Wittgenstein that are responsible for the presence of mysticism in their works.

With respect to Russell, one has to make a reservation that his mysticism was intellectual in nature. For him science was not just a matter of reflecting states of affairs in our theories, it was an ideal. He was observing in human nature an eternal longing for transcendental values, such as the good and the beauty, which for centuries was fulfilled by religion. Although he rejected religion as superstitious, it did not mean that he abandoned the ideal that religion stood for. It was simply science and mathematics that replaced religion as way to realize transcendental values in human life. Russell (1907/1948, 60) wrote among others: "Mathematics, rightly viewed, possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty (...) capable of a stern perfection such as only the greatest art can show". If science, the search for truth for its own sake, is the noblest endeavour of a humankind, then one has to admit that in order to practise and develop it, one has to reveal a mystical attitude to the world and to the self - a readiness to diminish one's own ego in front of the mysteries of the universe. Science discovers truth from the objective point of view and it puts the conviction that our subjective lives are priceless in doubt. In order to pursue scientific inquiries in spite of such depressing perspective one has to possess a certain amount of spiritual strength, and one finds it in a mystical experience of the world as a whole.

The roots of Wittgenstein's mysticism are to be found in Tractarian distinction between saying and showing. In his view philosophy was dealing only with things that could be shown and not said. For example, according to early Wittgenstein in order for a sentence to depict (to express) a state of affair it has to have the same pictorial form. A state of affair is what is sayable, but its form as

condition for meaningfulness of a sentence is not. However, it could be shown, because one can see how names are related to each other in a sentence, one can also see how objects are related to each other in a state of affairs, and hence one can see the similarity between the sentence and the state of affairs, even if one is unable to express it. Science is interested in truth-values of propositions about facts, but philosophy's focus is on a relation between proposition and facts, and this is a realm of what can only be shown, and not said. Distinction between saying and showing "invites extension to the mystical" (Glock 1996, 251). According to thesis 6.522 the mystical is an archetype of what is unsayable but what shows itself: "There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical" (Wittgenstein 2002, 89).

There is a grain of truth in saying that early Wittgenstein represents "logical mysticism". However, as I am arguing in this paper, that is not an entirely accurate description of his thought. One can show it in the example of Wittgenstein's solution to the problems of life, that is the problem of its meaning and the problem of how to live happily. In one the encrypted entries of his *Notebooks* we read: "Christianity is indeed the *only sure* way to happiness (...) but what if someone spurned this happiness? Might it not be better to perish unhappily in the hopeless struggle against the external world? But such life is senseless. But why not lead a senseless life? Is it unworthy?" (cited in: Monk 1991, 122). It is hard not see in a man that "hopelessly struggle against the external world" Bertrand Russell, with whom Wittgenstein, his most talented student, eventually diverged because of the differences in religious matters. Wittgenstein took a different path which aimed not at science, but at meaningful and ethical life. It is life that cannot be described in a philosophical treatise on happiness, but nevertheless whose meaning manifests itself in happiness of a man who lives it. This is why he was so attracted to Tolstoy's gospel: it did not offer him a doctrine of Christianity (Wittgenstein after all was not interested in things that can be said), but it showed him on the example of Jesus a meaningful life. In this way it was Christianity, and not logic that solved for Wittgenstein the problem of life. Therefore, while it is true that Wittgenstein's mysticism sprung from the logical considerations, one has to notice that it transformed into a more traditional form of mysticism. As he once admitted: "I am not a religious man: but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view" (Malcolm 1994, 1).

CONCLUSIONS

Both, Russell and early Wittgenstein intended to build a thoroughly rationalistic system. They wanted to follow reason and empirical evidence with mathematical acuteness. However, the same reason led them to the boundaries of human thought where they saw its insufficiency without a complement by the mystical attitude to the world. An important lesson one can take from this episode of the history of philosophy is the following: the foundations of philosophy even as rational as analytic philosophy are rooted in non-rational experiences such as an experience of being absolutely safe (Wittgenstein) or of unyielding despair (Russell). There is no rational philosophy without an attempt to cross the boundaries of a human intellect.

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MYSTICISM AND EARLY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

SUMMARY

Early analytic philosophy is known for its logical rigor that seems to leave no place for non-rational sources of knowledge such as mystical experiences. The following paper shows on the example of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein that despite of this early analytic philosophy was interested in mysticism and it also shows the roots of this interest. For Russell an application of logical methods to solving philosophical puzzled was an expression of more fundamental striving – to know the world as it is, *sub specie aeternitatis* – which is mystical in nature. In turn early Wittgenstein's philosophy sets the limits of meaningful propositions and provides the distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown and what manifests itself in the world. The latter belongs to the realm of the mystical.

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